In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job has (...) ten coins in his pocket” partly depends on how Smith uses the definite description “the man who will get the job” when he utters the proposition. Since, upon uttering the proposition, Smith has in mind a particular individual, namely Jones, and not just whoever will fit the attribute specified in the definite description, Smith uses the definite description referentially. And so when it turns out that it is Smith who eventually gets the job, the definite description fails to refer to Jones as intended by Smith, thereby making Smith’s proposition false. To think that Smith’s proposition is still true, in this regard, is to use the definite description attributively—that it is about whoever will fit the definite description. Apparently, when Gettier claims that Smith’s proposition is still true, to demonstrate that it is a case of JTB, he, in effect, imposes his attributive understanding of Smith’s usage of the definite description on Smith’s own epistemic situation. (shrink)

In this paper, I endeavor to provide a critical examination of a recent pioneering work that engages Jean-Paul Sartre’s insights in analyzing social media interactions – Michael Lopato’s “Social media, love, and Sartre’s look of the other: Why online communication is not fulfilling?”. I shall show that in so far as Sartrean insights are concerned in Being and Nothingness, Lopato misconstrued what Sartre really meant with the Look of the Other and love, and is mistaken in appropriating such insights in (...) arguing that online interactions are not fulfilling. I shall proceed by first discussing Sartre’s third region of being which is being-for-others which will comprise of the Look of the Other and the two attitudes to retrieve one’s freedom. Second, I shall flesh out the arguments of Lopato. Lastly, I shall present my critique of Lopato’s arguments which constitutes my reply to his work. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that embodied presence and ultimate commitments are not necessary for the authenticity of online relationships. In the first section, I will present Hubert Dreyfus’s Kierkegaardian analysis of the Internet. In the second, I will show the different positions that disagree with Dreyfus. And finally, in the third, I will look into the distinction between human to human and human to nonhuman online interactions, the continuity or discontinuity of the online and the offline relationships of (...) persons, and the forms of the relationship that occurred. From that analysis, I will derive some cases that will show the inadequacies and problems of the conditions presented by Dreyfus. (shrink)